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Overcoming inertia in retirement saving
Saving for retirement is one of the most important financial matters 
people face during their lives. Whereas the Dutch, on average, 
accumulate sufficient retirement wealth, quite a few people will end up 
with lower savings than they expect or need. It is surprising that many 
people remain inactive even when action is needed. This paper by Job 
Krijnen, Marcel Zeelenberg and Seger Breugelmans (all TiU) addresses 
two questions about inertia. First, what reasons can explain people’s 
inertia in retirement saving? Second, how can our understanding of these 
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1. Overview of policy recommendations
Table 1.
Why Now? How?
People know that retirement saving is 
important, yet many do not know why it 
is urgent. We recommend:
People know that retirement saving is 
important, yet many do not know 
how to take action. We recommend:
I: Provide timely reminders about the 
costs of waiting and the benefits of 
immediate action. Timely reminders 
emphasize urgency instead of impor-
tance, and make the appropriate aspects 
prominent at the appropriate time.
I: Simplify retirement saving to stimu-
late immediate action. Financial edu-
cation and communication should 
focus on ‘how’. Ideally, communica-
tion provides people with simple 
steps.
II:  Use active choice framing in com-
munication and choice architecture. 
Active choice framing focuses people’s 
attention on aspects that normally go 
unnoticed and makes people feel 
responsible for both their actions and 
inaction.
II: Provide commitment options. Give 
people the option to make decisions 
for their future, either binding or 
non-binding. Commitment options 
build on the tendency of people to 
perceive the future as a more appro-
priate time for retirement saving.
III: Implement deadlines to make the 
cost of waiting more salient. Deadlines 
create a sense of urgency and a clear 
moment for people to choose actively 
between action and inaction.
III: Restrict choice and set smart 
defaults. When choice is restricted 
and/or smart defaults are used, iner-
tia will have fewer negative conse-
quences.
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2. Abstract
Saving for retirement is one of the most important financial 
matters that people face during their lives. Whereas the Dutch 
on average accumulate sufficient retirement wealth, quite a few 
people nonetheless end up with lower savings than they expect 
or need. In this light, it is surprising that many people do very 
little to adapt their expectations or to adjust their saving strategy. 
People are inert. They remain inactive even when action is 
needed. This Netspar Survey Paper addresses two questions about 
inertia. First, what reasons are there for inertia in retirement 
saving? Second, how can our understanding of these reasons 
contribute to current and future developments in the Dutch 
retirement system?
 Reasons for action are primarily financial. Inertia leads to 
financial loss. However, when people do not understand this 
financial loss, or when they neglect or underestimate it, they 
do not take action. Reasons for inertia, on the other hand, are 
primarily psychological. Inertia can be motivated by an expected 
increase in accuracy, avoidance of potential regret, increase in 
confidence, retention of flexibility, present-biased preferences, 
and undue optimism about the future.
 This analysis of the reasons for action and the reasons for 
inertia provides one crucial insight: whereas many people know 
why they should be saving for retirement, they do not know why 
now and how. We will address these issues extensively. In a final 
section, we make several recommendations, structured around 
two questions: (1) ‘Why should I take action right now?’, and (2) 
‘How should I take action?’. 
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3. Introduction
Saving for retirement is one of the most important financial 
matters that people face during their working lives. Dealing with 
this issue can be difficult. The Dutch, on average, accumulate 
sufficient retirement wealth, but there are large differences 
between people, and some groups are at high risk of not 
saving enough (AFM, 2010a; De Bresser & Knoef, 2015; Knoef et 
al., 2015). According to recent estimates, around 20% of the 
Dutch population will not meet their own retirement goals (De 
Bresser & Knoef, 2015; Knoef et al., 2014; Knoef et al., 2015). The 
self-employed – a fast growing group in the Netherlands – as 
well as divorced and high-income households are particularly 
likely to retire with fewer savings than they expect (Knoef et al., 
2014, 2015). Why are so many people not saving enough to live 
comfortably during retirement?
3.1 Understanding insufficient retirement saving
One possible explanation is that people deem retirement saving 
not important enough. Those who find income during retirement 
unimportant, including people who expect not to live long 
after retirement and people who plan not to retire at all, will 
be reluctant to save. In a recent survey, representatives of Dutch 
retirement organizations were asked to explain why they could 
not attain the goals that industry has set for itself (Nell & Lentz, 
2013). The most frequent explanation was that people simply do 
not care enough about retirement. 
 This explanation probably holds true for some people, which 
is why raising awareness about the importance of adequate 
retirement saving can be an effective strategy to motivate people. 
However, to examine for how many people such a strategy is 
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relevant, we added two questions to an online questionnaire 
administered by Nibud. A representative sample of 1,537 Dutch 
participants (50.9% female; Mage = 42.83, SDage = 13.95) 
indicated to what extent they agreed with the statement “having 
enough retirement savings is important for me”. On a 7-point 
scale ranging from “I fully disagree” to “I fully agree”, 78% 
answered “I agree to some extent”, “I agree”, or “I fully agree” 
(M = 5.49, SD = 1.57). Moreover, when asked whether they would 
like to have sufficient retirement savings, 96% answered “yes”. In 
light of such numbers, it seems implausible that most people save 
too little for retirement because they deem it unimportant. 
 A related explanation for the problem of insufficient retirement 
saving is that people have other financial priorities that are more 
important at present, such as paying off debt or a mortgage loan. 
Again, although such considerations undoubtedly play a role in 
determining people’s saving decisions, we also know that retire-
ment saving is one of top financial priorities for most people. In 
another online survey by Nibud (2015), a representative sample of 
1,115 Dutch participants was confronted with 14 common financial 
goals and asked to what extent these were important to them. A 
majority indicated that retirement saving is an important goal, 
making it the second most important goal on the list (see Table 
2). Wijzer in Geldzaken (2014) reported a related finding: in their 
survey, over half of Dutch participants indicated that they should 
devote more time and effort to their own retirement preparation 
than they actually did. In the USA, the results of an annual poll 
showed that “not having enough money for retirement” is the 
number one financial worry (Gallup, 2015). Sixty percent of Ameri-
cans is “very” or “moderately” worried about this. Taking all these 
findings together, it seems clear that having money for retirement 
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is an important and desirable goal that most people care for and 
worry about. 
 It is possible that a minority of people are not motivated to 
save for retirement because they find it unimportant, because 
they think they already have enough money, because they do 
not expect to live long after retirement, or because they have 
other financial priorities at present. Emphasizing or increasing 
the importance of retirement saving can be an effective strategy 
to motivate those people. This possibility seems to underlie 
two broad categories of interventions. First, governments and 
Table 2.
Financial goal % Important % Not important % NA
Having money to pay for large or 
unexpected purchases.
78 14 7
Having enough money to live com-
fortably after retirement.
67 20 13
Being able to pay for health costs 
later in life.
59 28 14
Covering liabilities, such as unem-
ployment, disability, and death.
45 28 27
Paying off a mortgage. 36 22 42
Children’s education. 34 13 53
Repaying loans other than mort-
gage.
33 15 52
Being able to retire earlier. 27 40 33
Leaving an inheritance for children. 20 35 45
Rebuilding the house. 20 37 44
Helping children with buying a 
house.
17 32 51
Buying a new house. 17 36 47
Unpaid leave/sabbatical. 10 42 48
Buying a second house. 5 37 58
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employers aim to make retirement saving financially attractive 
by providing financial subsidies, such as tax advantages and 
employer matching. Second, the goal of financial education 
efforts is to further emphasize the long-term importance of sound 
financial behavior in general, and retirement saving in particular. 
The crucial question is how much one can expect from such 
interventions, as most people are aware of the importance of 
retirement saving. Moreover, for the relatively small percentage 
of people who are not yet aware of the importance of retirement 
saving (fewer than one in four according to the surveys discussed 
here), raising awareness or increasing motivation may not be 
sufficient to change behavior. A recent study found that financial 
subsidies have almost no effect on savings rates in Denmark 
(Chetty et al., 2014), and an extensive meta-analysis concluded 
that, overall, financial education efforts have very little effect 
on the financial behavior studied, explaining only 0.1% of the 
variance (Fernandes et al., 2014).
 To summarize, many people are not saving enough to meet 
their own goals or expectations after retirement. Attempts to solve 
this problem often rely on a seemingly plausible explanation: 
people find saving for retirement not important enough. Inter-
ventions based on this explanation – the provision of financial 
incentives and financial education – may prove effective for some 
people, but show very little overall effect on behavior. We believe 
that, to come to other, more (cost-)effective interventions, it is 
worthwhile to look beyond the most obvious explanations. In 
other words, how can it be that many people in the Netherlands, 
even though they consider retirement saving a top financial prior-
ity at present, still do not save enough to live comfortably during 
retirement?
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3.2 Inertia based on reasons
This Netspar Survey Paper aims to answer this question by 
investigating the psychology of inertia and its relevance for retire-
ment saving in the Netherlands. The Merriam-Webster dictionary 
defines inertia as a “lack of movement or activity especially when 
movement or activity is wanted or needed”. In psychology and 
economics, inertia is used to describe the tendency to remain 
inactive, even in the presence of good reasons to become active 
(e.g., Madrian & Shea, 2001; Van Putten et al., 2013). We believe 
inertia is a fitting and useful label for people’s lack of action in 
the domain of retirement saving. Most people are aware of the 
importance of retirement wealth, they consider retirement saving 
to be a financial priority, and they recognize that there are good 
financial reasons to save (or to save more) for retirement. None-
theless, they remain inert.
 In the remainder of this paper, we address two questions. 
First, what other reasons, besides not finding retirement saving 
important, can explain inertia in retirement saving? Second, how 
can our understanding of these reasons contribute to current and 
future developments in the Dutch retirement system? To answer 
these questions, we provide an analysis of (1) reasons for action 
and (2) reasons for inertia. 
 The reasons for action are primarily financial: starting to save 
early leads to more retirement wealth. In spite of these financial 
reasons for action, many people remain inert. We discuss three 
possible explanations: (1) people are ignorant about the financial 
costs of waiting, (2) people neglect the financial costs of waiting, 
and (3) people underestimate the financial costs of waiting. 
The reasons for inertia are mostly psychological: people remain 
inert because inertia has psychological advantages compared 
to taking action. Reasons for inertia include an increase in the 
14 survey paper 46
expected accuracy of a decision, avoidance of potential regret, 
an increase in confidence, retention of flexibility, present-biased 
preferences, and undue optimism about the future. 
 A categorization of reasons for action and reasons for inertia 
does not imply that inertia always follows from a deliberated 
analysis of quantifiable costs and benefits. It is true that the way 
people make decisions sometimes closely resembles how formal 
models would describe the process. People evaluate the costs 
and benefits of an alternative, weigh the different evaluations, 
and choose the alternative with the highest overall evaluation. 
However, on many occasions people follow a different, less calcu-
lated path; they assess reasons for and/or against one alternative 
or the other, and make a decision based on reasons that they 
can justify to themselves and to others (Shafir et al., 1993). Both 
models of human decision-making – formal models and ‘reason-
based choice’ models – can be of value in explaining inertia in 
retirement saving. Also, all reasons for action and inertia that we 
discuss in this paper can be used as input in a formal decision-
making process, as costs or benefits, and as compelling reasons in 
a reason-based decision-making process.
 It is also worth mentioning that the current analysis of reasons 
for action and for inertia is a simplification. The problem of 
insufficient retirement saving is extremely complex and cannot be 
‘solved’ by a single intervention based on our understanding of a 
single psychological process. But simplification serves a purpose. 
It helps focus on what is presumably an important source of 
insufficient retirement saving, namely inertia. Furthermore, 
simplification helps us to use this source – inertia – as a starting 
point for possible explanations and interventions. A near infinite 
set of financial and psychological reasons may motivate both 
action and inertia in retirement saving, and our analysis is in no 
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regard exhaustive. However, it does provide insight into the most 
promising ways of dealing with the problem.
3.3 Inertia at various stages of retirement saving
At this point, we wish to make clear that, when talking about 
retirement saving, we actually have a broad process in mind and 
that we focus on more than just the decision to save or not to 
save. For clarity and brevity, we use the term ‘retirement saving’ 
as a label for a broad range of actions related to retirement 
preparation. More specifically, we think that inadequate retire-
ment saving can result from the difficulties that people face at, at 
least, three different stages: understanding, planning, and saving. 
This paper connects the available evidence about inertia to each 
of these stages of retirement saving. Table 3 provides an overview 
of the role of inertia at each of these stages, the possible implica-
tions, and some relevant references.
 With a better understanding of the dynamics of inertia, we 
would ideally be able to help people at all three stages. This is 
valuable because people who wait and postpone retirement 
preparation are left with little or no time to adapt to their 
updated, more realistic expectations about their replacement 
rate, or to adjust their savings rate and strategy in order to meet 
expectations. On the other hand, those who start preparing for 
retirement early are more likely to end up with a satisfying level of 
retirement income (Munnell et al., 2011).
3.4 Inertia in the Dutch retirement system
The Dutch retirement system is widely regarded as one of the 
best in the world, in terms of both adequacy and sustainability 
(Allianz, 2014, 2015; Mercer, 2015; OECD, 2015). The state pension 
(AOW) provides all Dutch residents with a basic income after 
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retirement, replacing income at a flat rate of 50% of the minimum 
wage for couples or of 70% of the minimum wage for singles 
(Knoef et al., 2014; OECD, 2015). An extensive second pillar consists 
of employer-sponsored occupational plans, which cover around 
90% of employees (Knoef et al., 2014). These agreements are 
relatively generous, with projected gross replacement rates 
between 85% and 95% of pre-retirement earnings (OECD, 2015). 
 The Dutch retirement system is also relatively paternalistic. 
The majority of employees who work in industries with collective 
agreements are automatically enrolled in an occupational pension 
plan that provides little freedom of choice. It is normally not 
possible for individuals to opt out, to switch plans, to increase 
or decrease their savings rate, or to manage their investment 
strategy. There are several noteworthy exceptions to this 
Table 3.









cial matters in 
general and about 
retirement saving 
specifically.
…how to make 
people more likely 
to look for, attend 
to, and use finan-
cial information.
Lusardi & Mitchell, 
2007, 2011; Van 
Rooij, Lusardi, & 
Alessie, 2011
…planning stage. ... people do not 
know how much 
they are saving, 
how much they 
need, and how 
they could possibly 
bridge the gap.
… how to motivate 





Alessie, Van Rooij, 
& Lusardi, 2011; De 
Bresser & Knoef, 
2015; Prast & Van 
Soest, 2014; Wijzer 
in Geldzaken, 2012
…saving stage. … people fail to 
adjust their saving 
rate or their saving 
strategy, in spite of 
being knowledge-
able and fully 
informed.
…how to motivate 





Benartzi & Thaler, 
2007; Choi et al., 
2002; Fernandes et 
al., 2014
overcoming inertia in retirement saving 17
paternalistic rule, both in the accumulation and the payout 
phase. Table 4 provides an overview of the available freedom of 
choice per element of the Dutch retirement system. 
 Because the first and second pillars of the Dutch retirement 
system are relatively adequate, sustainable, and mostly manda-
tory, the problem of inertia may at first seem irrelevant for the 
Dutch situation. However, we strongly believe that this is not the 
case. In the Netherlands, inertia at all stages of retirement saving 
has become increasingly relevant and consequential, and might 
become even more so in the near future. We highlight here three 
key developments to support this statement. 
 First, the recent financial downturn and the ageing of the 
population are causing a decrease in the generosity of Dutch 
retirement arrangements (Commissie Goudswaard, 2010).  A recent 
Table 4.
Element Freedom of choice -  
current status
First pillar: state pension Mandatory
Second pillar: occupational retirement plans 
for employees under collective agreement
Enrollment Automatic and mandatory for 
most, optional for some
Contribution rate Automatic for most. Optional 
increased contribution for high-
income earners.
Investment strategy Automatic for most
Retirement age Flexible for most
Payout phase Options for variable payments 
(higher first)
Second pillar: occupational retirement plans 
for the self-employed and for employees not 
under collective agreement
Optional for most
Third pillar: individual retirement saving Optional
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study points out that the gross replacement rates as published 
by Allianz, Mercer, and the OECD do not tell the whole story 
(Knoef et al., 2014). In fact, there is large variance in replacement 
rates, and an estimated 31% of Dutch households are currently 
facing a replacement rate below 70% of their current income. 
As a consequence, the expectations of many people about their 
future retirement income are no longer in line with financial 
reality (Knoef et al., 2015). People think that they save enough 
to maintain their current level of consumption, while this is not 
always the case. For instance, people in certain income groups 
are particularly likely to either save too little or to have overly 
optimistic expectations. Inertia plays a role in this problem and 
in the possible solutions to this. People are unlikely to look up 
information online, to talk to financial advisors, to read letters or 
brochures, or to think about their financial future. In other words, 
people are inert when it comes to the understanding stage.
 Second, partly because of the large variance in expected 
replacement rates, there is an increasing call for a more 
individualized retirement system (Knoef et al., 2015; SER, 2015; 
Van Ewijk et al., 2014). In the future, the Dutch are likely to get 
more freedom of choice in their retirement saving (Lever et al., 
2015). Ideally, this should lead to well-suited saving strategies and 
better outcomes. In reality, however, we expect many people to 
remain inert, potentially leading to worse results depending on 
the default (Madrian & Shea, 2001).
 Third, inertia has major consequences for the growing number 
of self-employed workers, who are fully responsible for their own 
retirement saving. Already in 2010, 10-20% of the Dutch workforce 
was self-employed and therefore not eligible for an industry-wide 
collective pension arrangement (Commissie Goudswaard, 2010). 
As this group grows, the consequences of inertia in retirement 
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saving are expected to grow as well. Initial attempts to provide 
retirement saving products aimed at the self-employed show little 
success (Trappenburg, 2015). In helping the self-employed to save 
more for retirement, the crucial question is whether retirement 
saving products should be opt-in (as they currently are), opt-out, 
or mandatory (AFM, 2015a; De Jong, 2009). Additionally, if a plan is 
implemented, what is the most effective way to communicate this 
to the relevant group?
 Understanding the dynamics of inertia can thus be valuable 
for the major challenges to the Dutch retirement system. Why are 
people slow to adjust their expectations to changes in retirement 
arrangements? What would be the consequences of increased 
freedom of choice? How can we help the self-employed to build 
sufficient retirement wealth? These questions are relevant for 
what people know about and for how they deal with their first, 
second, and third pillar retirement savings. For instance, an 
understanding of inertia leads to recommendations on how to 
motivate people to visit websites with personalized information 
about retirement (e.g. www.mijnpensioenoverzicht.nl). It leads 
to recommendations on whether, where, and how to introduce 
freedom of choice in mandatory occupational retirement 
plans. It also leads to recommendations on how to implement 
occupational retirement plans for the self-employed.
 However, the effects of inertia go beyond the traditional first, 
second, and third pillars of retirement saving. People can build 
retirement wealth in many different ways. Decisions to work 
longer and retire later, to pay off a mortgage loan, to sell or buy a 
house, or to invest in the stock market all determine the level of 
retirement wealth. These decisions are affected as well by inertia 
in earlier stages of retirement saving. If people fail to make any 
effort to understand financial concepts or to plan for retirement, 
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they may likewise forego decisions on whether to work longer 
and retire later, to pay of a mortgage loan, to sell or buy a house, 
or to invest in the stock market. Understanding inertia helps 
us to understand the viability of policy implementations and 
communication strategies. By focusing on inertia, its possible 
causes, and its possible solutions, this article follows up on to 
the explicit call of the AFM (2015b, p. 7) to “bridge psychological 
barriers and activate consumers.”
 In summary, the premise of this Netspar Survey Paper is that 
inertia, same as actions, has both pros and cons. The aim is to 
better understand the reasons for action and inertia, through 
empirical evidence from both psychology and behavioral 
economics. In the remainder of this paper, we first analyze the 
reasons for action. We examine three explanations why people 
seem to be relatively irresponsive to financial reasons for action: 
ignorance, neglect, and underestimation. Then, we turn to 
the reasons for inertia. People may remain inert for a variety 
of reasons: accuracy, regret avoidance, confidence, flexibility, 
present-biased preferences, and undue optimism about the 
future.
 Based on the evidence for each of these reasons, we draw 
implications for how choice environment, information provision, 
and policy in the Dutch retirement system might be adjusted to 
how people actually behave. In a final section, we structure these 
implications by taking the perspective of the individual. Why are 
people – real human beings instead of rational agents or ‘econs’ 
(Thaler, 2015) – typically inert in retirement saving, and what can 
governments, retirement funds, and employers do to help them?
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4. Reasons for action
In retirement saving, the reasons for action are primarily financial. 
Retirement saving is dynamic in nature, with the timing of actions 
and choices affecting the outcomes of these actions and choices. 
Enrollment in a retirement plan at age 25 leads to a different 
outcome than enrollment in the same plan at age 45. In general, 
savings grow over time through accumulation of interest and the 
return on investments. Thus, starting to save early in life leads to 
more retirement wealth than starting to save late in life. 
 Why are so many people inactive when inertia is financially 
costly in the long run? In this section, we discuss three possible 
explanations. The first explanation is ignorance: people simply do 
not know that inertia is financially costly. The second is neglect: 
people know that inertia is financially costly, but they do not 
consider these costs when making a decision. A third explanation 
is underestimation: people know that inertia is financially costly, 
and they do consider these costs when making a decision, but 
they underestimate how high the costs actually are.
4.1 Financial cost: ignorance
People may delay retirement saving simply because they do not 
know that delay has long-term financial costs. It is possible that 
they confuse the dynamic nature of retirement saving with a static 
situation, where the timing of an action has no impact on the 
outcome of the action. 
 Research on financial literacy shows that in the Netherlands, 
like in the USA, a considerable percentage of people misunder-
stand basic financial concepts such as compound interest, infla-
tion, and risk diversification (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2009; Van Rooij 
et al., 2011; Van Rooij et al., 2012). One concept often incorporated 
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in this set of financial literacy questions is the ‘time value of 
money’, measured by the question: “Assume a friend inherits 
€ 10,000 today and his sibling inherits € 10,000 three years from 
now. Who is richer because of the inheritance? (a) my friend; (b) 
his sibling; (c) they are equally rich; (d) do not know” (e.g., Van 
Rooij et al., 2011, p. 606). People with a background in economics 
might consider it obvious that the inheritance will grow over 
time. However, when this question was asked to representative 
samples of Dutch and American adults, one out of five participants 
answered it incorrectly (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2009; Van Rooij et al., 
2011; Van Rooij et al., 2012). In other words, one out of five partici-
pants mistakenly assume that it makes no difference whether one 
invests money today or next year.
 People who are unaware of the financial cost of inertia will be 
more likely to delay retirement saving. Think of a self-employed 
person who recently started her own business. She may believe 
that retirement saving is important someday, but she may also 
think that it does not matter all that much whether she invests 
time, money, and effort in retirement saving this year, next year, 
or the year after. Because of this ignorance about the impact of 
time on financial outcome, she may postpone taking action until 
her business makes profit.
 A basic understanding of financial concepts, including the time 
value of money, can help people make better financial decisions. 
However, as mentioned before, simply explaining these concepts 
to people does little to affect their behavior at a later point in 
time. More can be expected from what are called just-in-time 
education attempts (Fernandes et al., 2014; Mandell, 2006). 
Explaining to people the important role of time in financial 
decisions has most effect if there is an immediate opportunity to 
act on this information. 
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4.2 Financial cost: neglect
Inertia is common, but only a minority of people are ignorant 
about the time value of money. Hence, a lack of understanding 
may explain the inertia of some, but it does not tell the whole 
story. A first alternative explanation for retirement saving inertia 
is people’s neglect of the long-term financial cost of inertia. This 
explanation differs from ignorance because it assumes that people 
know how time affects their outcomes, but that they do not 
consider it at the moment when they make their decisions. 
 From previous research, we know that people seldom sponta-
neously consider all normatively relevant factors when making 
a decision. One example is their tendency to neglect the oppor-
tunity costs of money (Frederick et al., 2009; Jones et al., 1998; 
Spiller, 2011). When contemplating whether to buy a € 25 book, 
the rational decision-maker should ask himself or herself ‘what 
is the next best use of this € 25?’ (e.g., Larrick et al., 1990). People 
should spontaneously think about ‘outside options’ (Spiller, 2011), 
including options that are not physically present or that are not 
explicitly mentioned. People should spend money on something 
only if none of the alternative uses of that money is valued more 
than the ‘focal option’. 
 However, maybe not surprisingly, this is not what people 
actually do when making decisions. Whereas people know that, 
for example, money spent on a car cannot be spent on something 
else, they do not always consider such opportunity costs (Frederick 
et al., 2009; Spiller, 2011). Jones et al. (1998) asked participants to 
describe five decisions that they had made. Participants indicated 
whether each decision was an opportunity (‘should I buy a new 
car or not?’) or a choice between options (‘should I buy a new 
car, or should I book a trip to New York instead?’). Of all decisions 
described by participants, 63% concerned whether or not to 
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pursue an opportunity. This illustrates that people often consider 
options in isolation, without directly comparing these against 
alternative options.
 Studies by Frederick et al. (2009) showed that making 
opportunity costs salient affects people’s choices. Participants 
were less willing to purchase a $14.99 DVD when the “not buy” 
option was framed as “keep the $14.99 for other purchases”. Jones 
et al. (1998) also found that people’s decisions can be changed by 
prompting them to come up with alternative uses of their money. 
Thus, merely reminding people of the existence of outside options 
already affected their decisions.
 It has been suggested that such interventions should not affect 
the financially poor, because opportunity costs are already highly 
relevant for them at all times (Thaler, 2015, p. 58; Frederick et 
al., 2009). In other words, a poor person should always consider 
opportunity costs. However, recent studies provide evidence 
against this suggestion. The neglect of opportunity cost is robust 
and seemingly independent of wealth (Plantinga et al., 2016). 
Apparently, most people neglect financial opportunity costs, 
regardless of whether their financial resources are scarce or 
abundant.
 Similar to the neglect of opportunity costs, a person may also 
neglect other aspects that are relevant to a decision but not 
explicitly mentioned. Examples are the neglect of energy efficiency 
when buying a home appliance or a car (Allcott, 2011; Allcott & 
Wozny, 2014; Sallee, 2013). Most people know that energy efficiency 
is a relevant aspect, and yet, when not explicitly mentioned, 
many fail to consider it during their decisions to buy or not buy. 
In retirement saving, the financial costs of inertia are not salient, 
easily causing them to be neglected. Many people who know 
that waiting to save means missing out on interest and possible 
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returns may nonetheless fail to spontaneously consider these costs 
at the appropriate moment. 
 Reminding people of neglected aspects of a decision has 
proven to be effective in other domains. Many countries now 
require prominent energy labels for both home appliances 
and cars. In a recent field experiment conducted by the U.K. 
Behavioural Insights Team, sending patients a text message 
reminder decreased the number of missed hospital appointments 
by almost 25% (Hallsworth et al., 2015). It was most effective 
if the message included the financial cost for the hospital of a 
missed appointment. Timely reminders may prove to be effective 
in the domain of retirement saving as well. At times when people 
typically make (or postpone) financial decisions, they could be 
reminded that even a short delay affects their future outcomes. 
Another possibility is having people actively choose between now 
and later.  Research has shown that people spontaneously think 
about many decisions as opportunities, with a single option to 
be accepted or rejected (Jones et al., 1998). A subtle change in 
the framing of a decision or action, from an opportunity frame 
(“would you enroll in a retirement saving plan?”) to a choice 
frame (“would you enroll in a retirement saving plan now or next 
year?”), can automatically shift a person’s attention towards 
aspects that differ between the two options. In this example, 
a person’s attention would shift from reasons for or against 
enrolling to differences between the two options and their 
consequences (enrolling now or enrolling later).
 To summarize, people who know about the financial costs of 
inertia may still neglect these costs when making decisions. We 
drew a comparison between the neglect of the costs of waiting 
and the neglect of other non-salient aspects of a decision, 
such as the opportunity costs and the energy efficiency of home 
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appliances and cars. Making the neglected costs of inertia visible 
at the right time, either through reminders or active choice 
framing, can affect people’s choices.
4.3 Financial cost: underestimation
Even if a person realizes that postponing retirement saving 
costs money, and even if such person considers this cost of 
waiting when making decisions, it is still possible that he or she 
underestimates how high the cost actually is. Putting money 
aside early in life is effective because of compound interest (or 
compound returns on investment). However, research has shown 
that people have problems estimating or calculating this effect 
(Almenberg & Gerdes, 2012; Eisenstein & Hoch, 2007; McKenzie 
& Liersch, 2011). Many people confuse compound interest with 
simple interest, or they use the simple interest rate as an anchor 
for their estimate and then insufficiently adjust this estimate 
upward (Eisenstein & Hoch, 2007). Take the following question: 
“You have an account holding € 10,000, with a fixed annual 
(compounding) interest of 4%. How much money would be on 
the account after 40 years?” Those people who confuse compound 
interest with simple interest calculate the interest after 1 year 
and multiply this by the number of years (€ 400 * 40 = € 16,000). 
From this calculation, they would conclude that the account holds 
€ 26,000 after 40 years. Other people use the outcome of the 
simple interest calculation as an anchor and adjust upwards. They 
would conclude that the account holds, for example, € 30,000. In 
reality, both answers are extreme underestimations. After 40 years 
of compounding interest, the account will hold over € 48,000. 
Thus, because of their misunderstanding, people underestimate 
the growth of savings. Underestimation is greatest over longer 
timespans and with higher interest rates, causing people to 
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particularly underappreciate the financial benefits of saving for 
the distant future (Goda et al., 2014). 
 If people underestimate the benefits of saving, they will also 
underestimate the cost of waiting. McKenzie and Liersch (2011) 
found that most people in their study underestimated the cost 
of a 20-year delay, both in a high and a low interest situation. 
Intriguingly, estimates did not differ between participants with 
high and low financial knowledge, nor between people with and 
without an understanding of compound interest. People who 
understand what compound interest is still fail to account for the 
effect of compound interest on savings growth and the cost of 
waiting. In a different study, people were inaccurate in estimating 
the cost of a one-year delay of a long-term investment (Krijnen et 
al., 2016a). Most participants (71.5%) underestimated the cost of 
waiting one year by more than one third. 
 Based on these findings, it seems plausible that people wait to 
save for retirement because they think that waiting is cheap. If this 
is the case, explaining to people the power of compound interest 
may help speed up retirement saving. Eisenstein and Hoch (2007) 
tested this hypothesis. In their study, they taught participants the 
Rule of 72, which gives a relatively accurate approximation of the 
number of years it takes for an amount of money to double, given 
the interest rate1. A short training procedure improved people’s 
estimates of the effect of interest compounding. 
 In daily life, people may find it difficult to apply the Rule of 72. 
First, dividing 72 by the interest rate is not a simple task for most. 
In addition, the outcome of this calculation only tells something 
1 The Rule of 72 is a way to estimate the number of years (y) it takes for an 
amount of money to double, given the interest rate (i): y = 72 / i. So if € 1,000 is 
deposited into a savings account with a fixed compound interest rate of 3%, it 
takes (72/3) = 24 years for the initial € 1,000 to grow to € 2,000 through 
compound interest.
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about the time it takes for an investment to double, whereas in 
many situations, people want to know how much money they 
will have after a certain number of years. Using the Rule of 72 to 
answer this question is less straightforward.
 Goda et al. (2014) examined how sending out various informa-
tion booklets affected people’s retirement saving decisions. A 
person’s likelihood to change his or her retirement saving con-
tribution was significantly higher if the booklet included a graph 
showing the projected effect of additional contributions on either 
total retirement wealth (34% higher) or on annual retirement 
income (29% higher), compared with a control condition where 
the booklet contained no such graph. Apparently, explaining the 
power of compound interest through visualization can reduce a 
person’s inclination to postpone saving.
 However, as with teaching people the Rule of 72, this interven-
tion may again not be the most efficient or most effective way 
to counter inertia. As we discussed before, a person who knows 
about the effect of compound interest and the cost of inertia will 
not necessarily consider this when making decisions. To make 
consideration of the cost of inertia more likely, we need simple, 
brief, and timely interventions. Therefore, instead of educating 
people about compound interest and savings growth, simply 
reminding them of the actual, probably higher-than-expected 
financial cost of inertia may be a better way to diminish the likeli-
hood of inertia.
 In a series of experiments, we found initial support for the 
viability of such an intervention (Krijnen et al., 2016a). We asked 
participants whether they would invest a windfall gain in their 
retirement savings account right away, or whether they would wait 
one more year. All participants read about the benefits of saving 
and could thus calculate the cost of waiting. However, fewer 
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participants preferred to wait if we explicitly mentioned the cost 
of waiting (e.g., “because of the compounded interest, waiting 
one year would accumulate to a loss of $7,800 at retirement 
age”) than if we did not mention this cost. Apparently, explicitly 
mentioning the cost of waiting affects people’s decisions, 
indicating that they tend to neglect or underestimate the financial 
cost of waiting. Moreover, these findings suggest that a simple 
single-sentence intervention at the right time can decrease the 
likelihood of inertia. Future research should investigate whether 
such an intervention would affect downstream financial behavior.
Inertia in retirement saving is financially costly. Nonetheless, 
many people take no action. So far, we have outlined three 
explanations for why people do so. People may be inert because 
they misunderstand, neglect, or underestimate the financial 
reasons for action. Simple interventions aimed at making the 
financial cost of inertia clear may decrease the likelihood of delay. 
However, there is another side to this story, which we discuss in 
the following section.
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5. Reasons for inertia
Inertia may not only be the result of the absence of reasons 
for action, but also of the presence of reasons for inertia. Put 
differently, a person may have good reasons for doing nothing. In 
this section, we discuss six factors that can make inertia attractive: 
accuracy, regret avoidance, confidence, flexibility, present-biased 
preferences, and undue optimism.
5.1 Accuracy
When people make decisions, taking more time generally leads 
to better outcomes. In other words, people make a trade-off 
between their time investment (‘speed’) and choosing the best 
possible option available (‘accuracy’). According to the speed-
accuracy framework of decision-making, people have access to 
a spectrum of decision strategies, ranging from fast-inaccurate 
strategies to slow-accurate strategies (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; 
Payne et al., 1993). This framework provides two insights that are 
relevant for the problem of retirement saving inertia. First, people 
base their selection of a decision strategy on the characteristics 
of the decision problem and environment (McAllister et al., 1979; 
Payne, 1982; Payne et al., 1988). For example, people select more 
analytic, effortful, and time-consuming decision strategies when 
the decision problem is important or irreversible (McAllister et al., 
1979). Important or irreversible decisions require greater scrutiny, 
because greater scrutiny is likely to lead to greater accuracy.
A second insight from the speed-accuracy framework is that, 
instead of trading off actual speed against actual accuracy, 
people are more likely to trade off anticipated speed against 
anticipated accuracy (Fennema & Kleinmuntz, 1995; Kleinmuntz 
& Schkade, 1993). Thus, they have to predict the time and effort 
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that they should invest in a decision as well as the resulting 
accuracy. However, their predictions are seldom perfect. They err 
in anticipating how much time and effort a strategy will take and 
in anticipating how accurate a strategy will be. Sometimes, greater 
scrutiny does not lead to more accurate decisions. 
 As stated above, both insights are relevant to the problem 
at hand. Even in the relatively paternalistic Dutch system, 
where most people have little to no freedom of choice in their 
occupational retirement arrangement, there are decisions to be 
made. People can choose to increase the contribution rate (if 
possible), to purchase a life annuity, or to open an additional 
retirement savings account with an insurance company or a bank. 
Other possibilities include investing in the stock market, repaying 
a mortgage loan, or choosing to retire later. There are obvious 
advantages to taking such actions as early as possible (speed), but 
people also want to make the best possible decision (accuracy). 
Delay of choice has the benefit of greater anticipated accuracy, 
and this need for greater accuracy is particularly strong when 
decisions are important or irreversible (McAllister et al., 1979), 
which is definitely the case for one-time financial decisions with 
great consequences such as retirement saving.
 It is possible that people delay decisions even without making 
a deliberate tradeoff between the (anticipated) costs and 
(anticipated) benefits. Research on heuristics shows that people 
often make decisions based on a single cue instead of on an 
elaborate analysis of costs and benefits (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). While such research mostly 
refers to decisions between two alternatives, it may also apply to 
decisions between acting and waiting. 
 The perceived importance of a task or decision can be a reason 
for inertia. People seem to use decision importance as a cue for 
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delay of decision (Krijnen et al., 2015). Participants were more 
likely to delay their enrollment in a hypothetical retirement saving 
plan when decision importance was emphasized or increased. 
Moreover, they delayed important decisions without regard to 
other relevant factors, such as the financial cost of waiting and 
the instrumentality of delay (i.e., whether delay would lead to 
more information or better options). Other research also points to 
a strong link between perceptions of importance and perceptions 
of difficulty: people intuitively associate important decisions and 
tasks with difficulty and the exertion of mental effort (Schrift et 
al., 2011; Sela & Berger, 2012). 
 To summarize, people assume – often rightfully so – that 
investing more time and effort leads to more accurate decisions 
and better outcomes. Based on this assumption, they seem 
to interpret importance as a cue to invest time and effort in 
a decision or task, regardless of whether this investment and 
the accompanying delay will improve or harm the outcome. In 
retirement saving, this logic may cause people to delay, even if 
this comes at a long-term cost. 
 The solution to this problem is not straightforward. The truth 
is that retirement saving is important, and this fact cannot and 
should not be hidden from consumers. However, it is crucial to 
realize that inertia in the form of decision delay can result from 
good intentions. People often delay action because they want to 
be make a good decision. Unfortunately, the provision of financial 
incentives, financial communication, and financial education 
may contribute to this problem (Krijnen et al., 2014). While the 
goal of such interventions is to motivate and activate consumers, 
research indicates that increasing, emphasizing, or explaining the 
importance of retirement savings can backfire by causing people 
to wait longer. 
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 It is crucial that people feel they can make accurate decisions 
and take effective action in the domain of retirement saving, 
also without spending a lot of time and effort. An effective 
solution involves two ingredients. The first is to shift focus in 
communication and policy from the long-term importance of 
retirement saving to the urgency of retirement saving. Most people 
already know and understand that retirement saving is important 
for their future. Instead, it may be more valuable to communicate 
and emphasize how acting sooner rather than later contributes to 
better outcomes. The second ingredient is a drastic simplification 
of the choice process (Sunstein, 2016). This can include providing 
simpler and less information, reducing paperwork requirements, 
making option comparison and filtering more straightforward, and 
providing preference learning tools (Broniarczyk & Griffin, 2014). 
Taken together, we recommend that policy and communication 
should be less concerned about the “why” of retirement saving 
and more about the “why now” and “how” of retirement saving. 
5.2 Regret avoidance
Another possible benefit of inertia is the avoidance of regret. 
People experience regret when they realize that an outcome could 
have been better, if only they had decided or acted differently (for 
an overview, see Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). The possibility of 
regret is often anticipated before a decision is made, motivating 
an avoidance of options that potentially cause regret (Zeelenberg 
et al., 1996).
 People judge action leading to a bad outcome as worse than 
inaction that leads to the same bad outcome (Spranca et al., 1991). 
In general, people also imagine greater regret from actions than 
from inactions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Landman, 1987; Ritov 
& Baron, 1995). However, when looking back at their lives, people 
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indicate that they regret inactions more than actions (Gilovich & 
Medvec, 1994, 1995). For instance, at the end of their lives, many 
people regret not pursuing the education that they would have 
liked most. This suggests that the intensity of regret from actions 
and inactions changes over time, with people regretting actions 
more on the short term and inactions more on the long term.
 The question is how these patterns of regret affect people’s 
choices in life. Given the motivation to avoid regret, are they 
more likely to take action or to remain inactive? Research suggests 
the latter. People have a preference for staying with the status 
quo (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), sticking with the default 
(Simonson, 1992), deliberating extensively (Reb, 2008), postponing 
decisions (Janis & Mann, 1977), and avoiding decisions altogether 
(Beattie et al., 1994). When uncertain about what the best option 
is, they often prefer inertia as a means to avoid potential regret 
in the present, disregarding the possible regret over inertia in the 
future.
 Research on the role of feedback and responsibility in regret 
has valuable implications for inertia in retirement saving. People 
experience (or anticipate) more regret when they receive (or 
expect) feedback about what could have been if they had acted 
differently (Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg et al., 1996). 
Also, people experience (or anticipate) more regret when they 
feel responsible for their decisions (Ordóñez & Connolly, 2000; 
Zeelenberg et al., 1998). Evaluating the consequences of inertia 
in retirement saving can be difficult because people receive little 
immediate feedback and feel little responsibility. For instance, if 
a self-employed person decides to enroll in a retirement savings 
plan and wants to evaluate this decision after one year, the 
comparison is obvious: “How much would I have saved if I had 
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not done anything?”2 However, if the same self-employed person 
had stayed inactive, it would be less clear how to evaluate the 
consequences of this inaction. Often, there is no clear benchmark 
to compare inaction to, nor is there a specific moment at which 
the person decides not to save for retirement. As a result, people 
may anticipate little immediate regret from inertia.
 Feedback and responsibility are not only part of the problem; 
they may also be solutions to the problem. Inertia becomes less 
attractive when people anticipate real, concrete, short-term, 
interpretable feedback about its consequences and about what 
could have been if they had taken action. Responsibility can be 
increased by ‘prompting’ people to make active decisions about 
their retirement at distinct moments in life. There is support 
for this idea from research on 401(k) enrollment in the USA. The 
number of newly hired employees who enrolled in a company’s 
retirement plan increased by 28% when the original opt-in 
enrollment (i.e., employees are not enrolled by default and can 
choose to enroll) was changed to an active choice enrollment 
(i.e., employees make an active choice between enrolling and 
not enrolling; Carroll et al., 2009). Similar active choice policies 
have been found to double the number of people donating blood 
(Stutzer et al., 2011) and to significantly improve adherence to 
medication (Keller et al., 2011).
 Providing feedback on the consequences of inertia may have 
a negative side effect. Inertia as a form of regret avoidance is 
worse when people realize that they have missed a much better 
opportunity in the past. This is inaction inertia, the tendency to 
2 Note that it is possible to make various other comparisons. For instance, the 
self-employed person could compare the outcome to a situation in which he 
or she would have saved more. However, this comparison is less likely because 
it is more complex to evaluate than the obvious benchmark of not saving 
at all.
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forego an attractive opportunity because an even more attractive 
opportunity was missed before (Tykocinski et al., 1995; Van Putten 
et al., 2013). In one of the initial studies on inaction inertia, 
participants imagined that they were considering whether to join 
a frequent flyer program (Tykocinski et al., 1995, p. 795). Joining 
the program was attractive; participants would immediately 
accumulate miles towards a free trip. Nonetheless, participants 
indicated being less likely to join (i.e., to take the attractive 
opportunity) if they had missed a much better opportunity to join 
in the past, compared to when the past opportunity was similar to 
the present one and to when no past opportunity was mentioned. 
Other studies have found inaction inertia to play a role in people’s 
tendency to switch to other brands after price promotions 
(Zeelenberg & Van Putten, 2005) and reluctance to sell stocks after 
missing better opportunities to do so in the past (Tykocinski et al., 
2004).
 Inaction inertia may also play a role in retirement saving. For 
instance, a woman aged 45 realizes that she is not saving enough 
for her retirement. She learns that the perfect moment to start 
saving was at age 25, when returns on her investment would 
have been much higher than now, twenty years later. Extending 
the past research on inaction inertia, we suspected that in these 
situations people would be less likely to start saving even though 
doing so at age 45 would still be better than not doing so at all. 
In a series of experiments to examine these ideas, we found 
initial evidence for inaction inertia in retirement saving decisions 
(Krijnen et al., 2016b). Participants indicated less willingness to 
enroll in a retirement savings plan when they first read about a 
much better opportunity in the (distant) past than when they first 
read about an only slightly better opportunity in the (recent) past. 
Based on these initial findings, we see the possibility that people 
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fall prey to a vicious cycle of inaction: the likelihood of saving may 
decrease the longer one remains inactive.
 Because of the potential role of inaction inertia in retirement 
saving, caution is warranted when providing feedback about 
how much one could have saved. The anticipation of such 
feedback may activate some people through anticipated regret. 
Yet for others, the same feedback may be a reminder of better 
opportunities from the past, causing even more inertia. Only 
when current saving opportunities are explicitly ‘decoupled’ 
from the past may people again realize that it is always better 
to start saving for retirement today than tomorrow (Van Putten, 
et al., 2007, 2008). Current opportunities can be decoupled 
from past opportunities by, for instance, indicating how present 
saving opportunities are inherently different from past saving 
opportunities or by presenting opportunities as active choices 
between multiple options.
 Taken together, we see that people are motivated to avoid 
short-term regret. Action typically causes more short-term regret 
than inaction, and therefore people remain inactive unless they 
have strong, justifiable reasons to take action (Zeelenberg et al., 
2002). Providing feedback and prompting people to make active 
choices may activate them. However, providing feedback may also 
backfire though inaction inertia.
5.3 Confidence 
Even in situations where all information is readily available, 
people often prefer to delay a decision (Bastardi & Shafir, 1998; 
Tykocinski & Ruffle, 2003). One reason for this is that inertia can 
make people more confident about their ability to make a correct 
decision. People gain confidence through delay, even if it the 
delay is ‘non-instrumental’, in the sense that it does not lead 
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to more information or an objectively better decision. Hence 
people’s tendency to ‘sleep on it’ before making consequential 
decisions. 
 When it comes to retirement saving, we know that a substantial 
number of people have little confidence in their own capabilities. 
A survey administered by Nibud (2015) asked a representative 
Dutch sample to indicate their agreement with statements 
about retirement finance. To the statement “If I wanted to get 
an overview of my financial situation after retirement, I would 
have no idea where to start”, 28.7% answered “I agree” or “I 
completely agree.” In addition, 34.6% answered “I agree” or “I 
completely agree” to “If I would have to arrange my own pension, 
I would be very afraid to make the wrong choices.” These figures 
indicate that a substantial number of Dutch people have little 
faith in their own financial capabilities.
 A possible intervention is to increase the general population’s 
confidence in their financial abilities. However, simply providing 
more information is no guaranteed effective strategy to 
accomplish this goal. A recent meta-analysis by Fernandes et al. 
(2014) found that financial education attempts had little to no 
effect on financial behavior. Moreover, Hadar et al. (2013) found 
that providing people with financial information could even have 
the opposite effect. After reading useful yet complex information, 
participants had less instead of more confidence about their 
financial knowledge. Attempts to improve financial knowledge 
carry the risk of decreasing people’s confidence and negatively 
affecting downstream financial behavior.
 On the upside, Hadar et al. (2013) report more promising 
results from interventions that are directly aimed at improving 
people’s subjective instead of objective knowledge. For instance, 
participants who answered an easy question about retirement 
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saving rated their own financial knowledge as higher than 
participants who answered a difficult question about retirement 
saving. In turn, this higher subjective knowledge led to a greater 
willingness to join a 401(k) plan. In support of these findings, 
Van Rooij et al. (2012) report that Dutch participants with high 
confidence in their financial abilities are more likely to plan for 
retirement, independent of their objective financial knowledge. 
Thus, whether people take action and prepare for retirement may 
be positively impacted by the confidence they have in their own 
financial abilities3.
 In short, many people have low confidence in their own 
financial abilities and often delay for the sake of gaining 
confidence. Overall, providing financial education has little effect 
on their financial behavior (Fernandes et al., 2014). Moreover, 
providing as much financial information as possible can further 
complicate retirement saving and lead to lower confidence. 
Instead, financial education attempts should aim at increasing 
people’s confidence in their financial capabilities through 
simplification of retirement saving. 
5.4 Flexibility
Another possible reason for inertia is that it provides or leads to 
retention of flexibility. People value the freedom of choice and 
being able to switch options, especially when uncertainty about 
their future preferences is high (Jones & Ostroy, 1984; Kreps, 
1979). Strongly related to this preference for flexibility is the 
psychological reactance of people to committing to a single option 
3 There is also evidence for a negative effect of too much confidence in financial 
decisions (e.g., Hoffman & Post, 2014). For instance, García (2013) suggests that 
people with high confidence in their own capabilities may stop acquiring 
information altogether. We suspect that such ‘overconfidence’ plays a role in 
retirement saving decisions as well.
40 survey paper 46
and hence giving up the freedom to choose alternative options 
(Brehm & Brehm, 2013). In other words, choosing one option can 
feel like losing other options (Carmon et al., 2003), and it is this 
feeling of loss that may cause negative arousal and avoidance 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).
 Shin and Ariely (2004) examined whether these two factors 
– the preference for flexibility and the aversion to losses – play 
a role in people’s tendency to ‘keep doors open’. In their 
experiments, they let participants explore options before making 
a decision. For half of the participants, options would disappear if 
they had not been looked at for a period of time. Results showed 
that people were willing to invest resources in order to keep all 
options available, even when those options were irrelevant to 
the decision. A final study found that, in this particular game, 
the effect was mainly driven by aversion to losses and less so by 
preference for flexibility.
 In retirement saving, taking action often involves making 
a commitment, and thereby limiting future choice options. 
Currently, second pillar retirement plans in the Netherlands 
provide no or little flexibility (Nijboer & Boon, 2012). However, 
in cases where people do have freedom of choice, such as in 
third pillar plans, initial decisions are typically binding and 
consequential. The more distant retirement is, the more uncertain 
people are about their future wants and needs. They may prefer 
to avoid such commitments, retain flexibility, and keep options 
open until uncertainties resolve (Amador et al., 2006; Kreps, 1979; 
Krishna & Sadowski, 2014). 
 Sometimes, the fear of giving up flexibility or losing options 
is partly unfounded. First, many actions in retirement saving 
may be perceived as a commitment, even when future choice is 
not limited at all. For instance, going to a financial advisor or 
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contacting a financial institution for information does not affect 
the availability of other options. However, people can still perceive 
this action as a commitment and therefore postpone it. Second, 
people sometimes wait for uncertainties to resolve, even when 
these uncertainties turn out to be irrelevant to their decisions 
(Shafir, 1994; Shafir & Tversky, 1992; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). For 
instance, a self-employed person may wait to save for retirement 
until he or she is sure about starting a family, even though such 
person would eventually prefer to save for retirement either way.
To motivate action in retirement saving, we propose two possible 
strategies. The first is to increase and emphasize the flexibility 
that people have, as well as the reversibility of actions and 
decisions. People are less likely to delay decisions when a decision 
is reversible (Krijnen et al., 2015). Clothing retailers are aware of 
this and offer money-back guarantees to motivate people to take 
action and buy a piece of clothing, even when uncertain. Whereas 
money-back guarantees are implausible in retirement saving, 
there are situations where people can revise or (partly) reverse 
their decisions and actions at a later point in time. For instance, 
meeting with the retirement saving expert of Company X does 
not restrict a person’s possibility to contact Company Y later on. 
Emphasizing the non-restrictive nature of financial advice could 
activate people. 
 Second, prompting people to ‘think through uncertainties’ 
can provide insight into the irrelevance of these uncertainties 
for their retirement saving inertia (Shafir, 1994; Shafir & Tversky, 
1992). People may believe that they have valid reasons to postpone 
action, but when asked what they are waiting for, they may realize 
that these uncertainties are not relevant to the decision at hand.
The preference for flexibility and its role in causing inertia should 
also be considered in the current discussion on flexibility in the 
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Dutch retirement system (e.g., Bergamin et al., 2014; Commissie 
Goudswaard, 2010; Nijboer & Boon, 2012; Nijman & Oerlemans, 
2008; Wijzer in Geldzaken, 2015). Introducing flexibility where 
no flexibility exists now (e.g., in second pillar arrangements) 
may increase the negative consequences of inertia. However, 
increasing or emphasizing flexibility, reversibility, and freedom of 
choice where this already exists as (e.g., in the third pillar) may 
instead motivate people to take action.
 Thus, other reasons for inertia are the preference for flexibility 
and the aversion to losing options. People may perceive action 
as an irreversible commitment and therefore prefer not to act. 
If this is the case, emphasizing flexibility and reversibility, as 
well prompting people think about their reasons to wait, could 
motivate action.
5.5 Present-biased preferences
People discount outcomes over time, meaning that distant 
future outcomes weigh less heavily than immediate outcomes. 
Temporal discounting implies that the benefits of an action, such 
as financial reward or pleasure, are valued less when distant in 
time than when they are immediate. For instance, receiving a 
€ 1,000 bonus 40 years from now is less attractive than receiving 
the same € 1,000 bonus right away. Temporal discounting applies 
also to non-monetary outcomes. For instance, doing something 
fun today seems more attractive than doing the same fun thing 
one year from now. In fact, people like immediate benefits so 
much that they often prefer smaller, sooner benefits to larger, 
later benefits. Think of how most people prefer watching a good 
movie to reading about the difference between stocks and bonds. 
Watching the movie is immediately rewarding (i.e., it is fun) for 
most people. Reading about stocks and bonds is not immediately 
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rewarding. The only benefits of this activity are the possibly higher 
financial returns that materialize in the future.
 Besides discounting the benefits of action, people also discount 
the costs of action. Resources required to perform the action 
(e.g., time and effort) are valued less in the future than in the 
present. For instance, people may perceive vacuum cleaning as 
less time-consuming in the future than in the present. Together, 
the pattern of discounting benefits and costs over time causes a 
‘present bias’: people put greater weight on benefits and costs in 
the present than on benefits and costs in the future (Ainslie, 1975; 
Akerlof, 1991; Strotz, 1955).
 Present-biased preferences cause a specific form of inertia, that 
of procrastination. People typically procrastinate on tasks that 
involve immediate costs but provide few immediate benefits, such 
as studying for an exam, doing the dishes, or saving for retirement 
(O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). Such tasks typically require an 
immediate investment, in the form of effort, time, or money, 
whereas the associated benefits are experienced in the future. 
People perceive the required up-front investments as less painful 
in the future than in the present, causing them to postpone the 
task. This reasoning repeats itself over and over again, resulting 
in a cycle of procrastination. In other words, people procrastinate 
tasks or actions that they intend to do, but that they do not like to 
do right now.
 Procrastination plays a role in many aspects of retirement 
saving4. People know that they should read the letters from their 
retirement fund, but they dislike the necessary mental effort. 
People know that it can be smart to meet with a financial advisor, 
yet they dislike the time that it takes out of their busy schedule. 
4 In a recent Netspar NEA Paper, we analyzed the problem of procrastination and 
its relevance for retirement saving in more detail (Krijnen et al., 2014).
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Van Rooij and Teppa (2014) found evidence for procrastination 
as a specific form of inertia in the domain of retirement saving. 
According to their analysis, people are less likely to deviate from 
the default if doing so is more complex (i.e., if they score low on 
financial sophistication). Thus, people procrastinate if they are 
overwhelmed by the immediate mental effort that is needed to 
do so.
 Even though improving the financial know-how of the Dutch 
population may be effective in overcoming procrastination, we 
propose a more logical first step, namely, make the necessary 
tasks or actions easier. People are less likely to procrastinate tasks 
or actions that need only little investment in terms of time and 
effort. The Dutch Tax and Customs Administration (‘Belastingdi-
enst’) has relied heavily on this strategy by providing simplified 
digital tax return forms and pre-filling most information. Like 
filing tax returns, preparing for retirement is a hassle for most 
people. People procrastinate retirement preparation because they 
expect it to be difficult, confusing, complex, and time-consuming. 
Procrastination would be less likely if, instead, people think that 
small, simple, and quick steps can help them towards better 
retirement saving.
 A second strategy to counter procrastination is to make the 
action or task attractive. This strategy is often used to promote 
other behavior that has long-term benefits. For instance, many 
apps aim to promote healthy behavior by making physical exercise 
fun and rewarding (e.g., Zombies, Run!; Superhero Workout). 
Presumably, most people know that regular exercise produces 
health benefits. However, these benefits come into effect only 
in the distant future. These apps may motivate healthy behavior 
because they increase the perceived immediate benefits of 
exercise.
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 It may seem difficult, if not impossible, to make retirement 
saving fun and attractive. A related strategy we deem worth 
exploring in the context of retirement saving is to emphasize (or to 
let people anticipate) the immediate positive affective responses 
to completing a financial task. Anticipated affective responses play 
an important role in predicting and changing behavior (Richard 
et al., 1996a, 1996b). In retirement saving, people dislike the 
anticipation of having to take action in the future, as well as the 
uncertainty that they experience in the meantime. This is illus-
trated by the fact that, in the USA, retirement saving is the number 
one financial worry (Gallup, 2015), and that, in the Netherlands, 
retirement saving is one of people’s top financial priorities (Nibud, 
2015). If people worry about retirement saving, then taking action 
to end this worry may have immediate affective advantages. 
Often, people are motivated to do aversive tasks simply because 
they imagine how good they are going to feel immediately after-
wards. When it comes to retirement saving, it could be effective to 
communicate that doing finances creates peace of mind, a sense 
of fulfilment, or even pride in oneself. 
 Providing people with commitment options for future saving 
has already proven to be another effective way to battle pro-
crastination. Thaler and Benartzi (2004) incorporated the idea of 
commitment in their Save More Tomorrow plan. Instead of asking 
eligible employees if they wanted to start saving for retirement 
right away, the Save More Tomorrow plan asked employees if 
they wanted to start saving in the future. People deem the future 
a more suitable time to save than the present and are therefore 
more likely to commit to future enrollment. In the Netherlands, it 
may be useful to have commitment options available for the self-
employed. Because of the processes described here, the option to 
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start saving next year may be more appealing than the option to 
start saving right away. 
 Commitment options are not always plausible or easy to 
implement. In such cases, providing so-called implementation 
intentions can serve as a less enforcing and more widely appli-
cable solution. Implementation intentions can be described as 
‘soft’ commitment options. People are prompted to make concrete 
plans that simplify the execution of behavior, without a binding 
agreement or commitment to an outside party (Gollwitzer, 1999). 
Specifically, people contemplate where, when, and how to per-
form a certain behavior. Forming such concrete plans has already 
proven effective in helping people reduce fat intake (Armitage, 
2004), increasing influenza vaccination rates by 12% (Milkman et 
al., 2011), and getting the unemployed back to work (Behavioural 
Insights Team, 2015). 
 We think that soft commitment options can promote a wide 
range of behaviors related to retirement saving, not just plan 
enrollment. People could be prompted to plan a personal finance 
day once every month, as well as to describe what they would 
be doing that day (e.g., “on Sunday, January 20, I will check how 
much I have saved already by looking at www.mijnpensioenover-
zicht.nl”). Ideally, implementation intentions are as concrete as 
possible and include some kind of reminder.
 To summarize, people have present-biased preferences. 
The resulting tendency to procrastinate is strongest for tasks or 
decisions that require an immediate investment and that lead to 
payoffs or benefits only in the distant future. Possible solutions 
include making retirement saving easy, making retirement saving 
attractive or immediately rewarding, and providing people with 
both hard and soft commitment options.
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5.6 Undue optimism
People sometimes postpone a decision or task because they 
are optimistic about the future as a more appropriate time for 
completion. People are overly optimistic about how much time 
or money is required to complete a task in the future (Buehler 
et al., 1994). When making plans, they focus on the unique 
characteristics of the task and on how their plans might unfold, 
but they ignore how most plans in the past have not worked 
out as expected. Because of this biased reasoning, people 
demonstrate a planning fallacy: predictions about the time or 
money it takes to complete a task are overly optimistic (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979).
 A second type of optimism is people’s belief that they will have 
more resources available in the future than in the present (Tam 
& Dholakia, 2011; Zauberman & Lynch Jr., 2005). For instance, 
people may believe that there will be enough time to think about 
retirement saving in the future. However, once the future becomes 
the present, time is often scarce and postponement seems the 
best thing to do again. In a similar way, people may think that 
they currently have insufficient money to increase their retirement 
savings, but that this will be different in the future.
 To summarize, when making plans, people are generally too 
optimistic in two ways. First, they underestimate how much 
time, effort, and money a specific task will require in the future. 
Second, they overestimate how much time, effort, and money 
they will have available to execute their plans in the future. Both 
types of optimism contribute to the problem of procrastination 
as a specific form of inertia, because tomorrow always seems a 
more appropriate time for doing a task than today (Lynch Jr. & 
Zauberman, 2006; Pychyl et al., 2000). The possible solutions to 
this problem within the context of retirement saving are similar 
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to those discussed in the section on present-biased preferences: 
increase people’s understanding of how they can save for 
retirement, simplify information and required actions, and 
provide commitment options. 
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6. Why now and how? Remedies for inertia in retirement saving
So far, this Netspar Survey Paper has provided an overview of 
possible reasons for action and reasons for inertia in retirement 
saving (see Table 5). 
 In the previous section, these reasons led to initial recommen-
dations for policy and communication in the domain of retirement 
saving. In this section, we aim to bring more structure to these 
recommendations. We do so by taking the individual decision-
maker’s perspective instead of the policymaker’s perspective, as 
we base our recommendations on an important insight about 
inertia: while people know why they should be saving for retire-
Table 5.
Reasons for action Reasons for inertia
I: Financial cost
Starting to save early in life is 
expected to lead to greater 
wealth after retirement than 
starting to save late in life. 
Nonetheless, people avoid 
action because of:
a: Ignorance. People do not 
know the cost of waiting.
b: Neglect. People do not 
consider the cost of waiting 
when making decisions.
c: Underestimation. People 
underestimate the cost of 
waiting.
I: Accuracy
People expect that investing more time and 
effort will result in more accurate decisions. 
II: Regret avoidance
People anticipate more short-term regret from 
action than from inaction. Therefore, people 
remain inactive unless they have strong, 
justifiable reasons to take action.
III: Confidence
People delay decisions in order to gain 
confidence, even when this delay is non-
instrumental.
IV: Flexibility
People delay choice because they prefer flexibility 
and dislike losing options.
V: Present-biased preferences
People procrastinate tasks and decisions because 
outcomes are discounted over time.
VI: Undue Optimism
People procrastinate tasks and decisions because 
they are overly optimistic about the required and 
available resources in the future.
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ment, they do not know why now and how. People take no action 
towards retirement saving because they have a hard time answer-
ing two questions: (1) ‘Why should I take action right now?’, and 
(2) ‘How should I take action?’ We structure this section around 
these two questions. 
 In the first part, ‘Why Now?’, we recommend (1) provision 
of timely reminders, (2) use of active choice framing, and (3) 
implementation of deadlines. The goal of these recommendations 
is to make neglected or underestimated aspects of retirement 
saving more apparent. In the second part, ‘How?’, we recommend 
(1) simplification, (2) provision of commitment options, (3) 
restriction of choice, and (4) use of smart defaults. The goal of 
these recommendations is to make retirement saving easier. 
In both parts, we return to the specific recommendations, analyze 
the logic that connects them, and discuss the relevance of these 
recommendations to the current debates and developments in the 
Dutch retirement system. Our aim is to be as specific as possible, 
but we also acknowledge the difficulty in doing so. Inertia plays a 
role in all stages of retirement saving, and the reasons discussed 
in this paper lead to a wide variety of possible implications for a 
wide variety of problems. The implications in the remainder of this 
paper serve as concrete examples and illustrations. Additionally, 
we want to emphasize that these recommendations are based 
on our reading of the academic literature and our research on 
human decision-making. We believe it is important to not simply 
implement recommendations, but to first test them with the 
relevant population, and to adjust them based on such testing. 
This will lead to evidence-based interventions that are much more 
likely to result in favorable behavioral change.
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6.1 Why now?
People know that retirement saving is important, yet many do not 
know why it is urgent. The financial costs of inertia are often far 
from apparent, or they are hard to estimate and therefore not fully 
considered by people. Moreover, the immediate psychological 
benefits of inertia outweigh the uncertain, unclear, and delayed 
financial benefits of taking action. Based on this reasoning, we 
arrive at three recommendations: provide timely reminders, use 
active choice framing, and implement deadlines. 
Provide timely reminders about the costs of waiting and the 
benefits of immediate action. This type of communication 
should differ from most of the generic financial education that 
governments, retirement funds, and employers currently offer 
to consumers. The focus should not be on the importance of 
retirement saving, but on the urgency of retirement saving. Most 
people already know that retirement saving important, but not 
why it is urgent. Emphasizing importance may backfire by causing 
delay, whereas emphasizing urgency may encourage immediate 
action. Timely reminders should also make the appropriate 
considerations clear at the appropriate time. Providing people 
with general information about retirement saving is pointless if 
people do not use this information when making decisions (or 
when ‘choosing’ to not take action). Obviously, knowing when 
people are most likely to be thinking about retirement saving is a 
prerequisite for successful implementation.
 In the Netherlands, second pillar retirement arrangements 
are becoming less generous. However, people’s expectations 
are often not in line with reality, and it has proven difficult to 
get people to look up information about their own financial 
situation. For instance, 40% of participants in a survey by Wijzer 
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in Geldzaken (2014) indicated they had never before thought about 
their income and spending after retirement. The same survey 
found that even the most popular information sources were used 
by only a small percentage of participants. The website www.
mijnpensioenoverzicht.nl was used by 34%, and the individual 
pension statement (‘UPO’) was used by 29%. Overall, around half 
of the participants did not consider retirement saving as urgent. 
Timely reminders can increase a sense of urgency, and as such they 
direct people to information sources at a time when they are most 
relevant and when subsequent action, if needed, is most likely.
Let us give an illustration of when, where, and how timely 
reminders can be implemented in the Dutch retirement system. 
People whose retirement age lies in the distant future – let us say, 
those under 40 – are particularly unlikely to plan for retirement. 
For this group, there may seem little reason to take immediate 
action. However, there are moments, for instance right after 
getting a promotion or a pay raise, when people are more likely 
to think about their financial future. The employer could use 
this moment to send the employee a reminder, in the form of 
a letter or email. This reminder could include a link to www.
mijnpensioenoverzicht.nl and briefly mention the downside of 
delaying a visit to this website by another year. Contrary to typical 
financial information, this type of information reminds people of 
the relevant aspects of a decision at the appropriate moment.
Use active choice framing in communication and in choice 
architecture. Active choice framing focuses people’s attention 
on the aspects of a decision that normally go unnoticed. People 
encounter many opportunities to take action about retirement 
saving, yet rarely are they required to actively choose between 
‘doing it now’ and ‘doing it later’. Framing opportunities as 
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choices can make the cost of waiting and other consequences 
of the status quo more apparent and therefore decrease inertia. 
Moreover, people feel more responsible for their decision if they 
actively choose between taking the decision now or later than 
if they opt in. This increase in responsibility is expected to make 
inertia for the sake of avoiding regret less likely.
 In the Netherlands, a growing number of self-employed per-
sons are not automatically enrolled in a second pillar retirement 
plan. Recent debates about this problem have focused on the 
type of second pillar arrangement that should be available to this 
group (AFM, 2015a; De Jong, 2009). The literature on inertia has 
additional implications for how to present these arrangements to 
the self-employed. Active choice framing could be implemented 
to help people who transition from wage-employment to self-
employment. When they finalize their business paperwork, they 
could be asked to fill in a form which lets them actively choose 
between (1) enrolling in a retirement saving plan now or (2) 
postponing the decision to next year. Framing opportunities as 
choices, and making these choices active, can decrease the like-
lihood of inertia.
Implement deadlines to make the cost of waiting clear. Because 
inertia often takes the form of passive and repeated delay, it is 
hard to quantify or value its consequences. This makes inertia 
a psychologically attractive option, as short-term regret is least 
likely in the absence of concrete and immediate feedback. 
Implementing (binding or non-binding) deadlines can have 
two advantages. First, a deadline creates a psychological sense 
of urgency, even when there are no material consequences to 
missing the deadline. Second, a deadline serves as a moment for 
people to ‘choose’ between taking action and remaining inactive, 
54 survey paper 46
which can be particularly effective in the anticipation of future 
feedback about outcomes.
 One could think of easy ways to create deadlines without 
imposing additional costs on people. For instance, the financial 
sector as a whole could send out individual pension statements 
(UPOs) around the same time each year. In addition, it could urge 
people to read their pension statement before a specific date or 
within a certain period (e.g., within two weeks after receiving 
the statement). Before the deadline, if there are any problems 
with or questions about the statement, people can easily 
contact the financial institution. Such a deadline has no formal 
consequences, because people can of course always contact their 
financial institution if they have problems or questions. However, 
in practical terms, the deadline creates a sense of urgency and a 
clear moment for people to choose between taking action and 
remaining inactive. 
6.2 How?
People know that retirement saving is important, yet many do 
not know how to take action. Retirement saving is perceived 
as complex, laborious, and time-consuming. People fear the 
possibility of regret, value flexibility until uncertainties resolve, 
wait to gain confidence in their financial abilities, and perceive 
the future to be a more appropriate time for taking action. Based 
on these reasons for inertia, we come to three recommendations: 
simplify, provide commitment options, and restrict choice and set 
smart defaults.
Simplify retirement saving to promote immediate action. People 
procrastinate difficult tasks that have few immediate benefits. 
Procrastination would be less likely if retirement saving were 
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easier. Current financial education and communication towards 
consumers mostly focuses on the ‘why’ of retirement saving. It 
explains the importance and the possible long-term benefits of 
saving. Instead, financial education and communication towards 
consumers should focus on ‘how’. Ideally, communication 
provides people with simple steps that take only minutes and 
need little preparation.
 Take the following problem. Many people leave their individual 
pension statement unopened or give it little attention. They 
know the information to be of importance someday, but have 
little clue how to distill relevant information from the statement 
and what to do with it (AFM, 2010b; Kuiper et al., 2013; Lentz 
& Pander Maat, 2013). An international evaluation of pension 
statements concluded that the document should do more than 
just provide information (Antolín & Harrison, 2012). Instead, it 
should encourage and facilitate action. In general, providing 
information about retirement serves one clear purpose: helping 
people build sufficient retirement wealth. As long as it is not 
clear how a statement, letter, or website serves this purpose, not 
even indirectly, then its necessity, design, or content should be 
reconsidered. 
 More specifically, we recommend drastic simplification of the 
information provided via the individual pension statement, 
its cover letter, and other forms of communication (e.g., 
www.mijnpensioenoverzicht.nl). Simplification increases the 
likelihood of people reading the information, understanding the 
information, and following up with action if needed. Fortunately, 
improvements have already been made in the Netherlands. 
For instance, the focus on www.mijnpensioenoverzicht.nl is 
now on the individual’s projected net income, thus making its 
consequences easier to grasp. 
 In the future, we believe specific attention can be devoted 
to the individual pension statement. It is crucial that people 
understand how to read the information and what to do with it, 
a vision that is shared by Dutch retirement organizations (Nell & 
Lentz, 2013). We would recommend adding a (uniform) letter or 
card explaining, in a few steps and in plain language, preferably 
using illustrations, how people should read their statement 
and what they can do as follow-up. Contrary to a cover letter 
or magazine explaining the importance of reading a pension 
statement, our proposed adjustments would focus on the action 
itself (e.g., “you need only two minutes to read your statement), 
on immediate results (e.g., “afterwards you feel better for having 
more insight into your financial situation”), and on possible 
follow-up actions (e.g., “go to www.mijnpensioenoverzicht.nl for 
more information”). 
Provide commitment options. People tend to see their future as 
bright. When it comes to the future, financial investments seem 
less impactful, laborious tasks less laborious, difficult decisions 
less difficult, and time-consuming actions less time-consuming. 
Also when it comes to the future, sufficient time, money, and 
willpower seems available, uncertainties are expected to be 
resolved, and people expect to have the confidence to make 
financial decisions. Irrespective of whether this bright view of 
the future is accurate or not, it is problematic in the context of 
retirement saving because it often withholds people from taking 
action right now. The future is simply perceived to be a more 
appropriate time for dealing with tasks and decisions related to 
retirement saving, causing people to procrastinate.
Evidently, it is difficult to change the psychological mechanisms 
underlying procrastination. What can be done, however, is to 
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design and communicate retirement saving options that put these 
psychological mechanisms to work to people’s own advantage. 
Commitment options do exactly this, as they provide people the 
opportunity to make decisions that affect their future outcome 
but not their immediate outcome. Many people find saving 
for retirement attractive in principle, but they are reluctant to 
enroll because they do not want to invest money right now. 
Commitment options provide the ideal opportunity in this case. 
People can commit to saving but are not required to start investing 
money immediately. In other words, if the downside of enrolling 
in a retirement savings plan (e.g., having to put in money) is 
delayed, procrastination becomes less likely.
 In practice, these commitment options could come in two 
forms: binding or subtle. One example of a possible binding 
commitment option in retirement saving is to let newly self-
employed persons make decisions that become effective after a 
certain delay. Asking young entrepreneurs to commit to putting in 
money two years from now is psychologically different from asking 
them to commit to putting in money right away. Therefore, if a 
future commitment option is available, people will be more likely 
to select it. Two years later, people will be unlikely to quit because 
this takes time and effort and because people have grown 
accustomed to the idea of saving for retirement. 
 More subtle commitment options include what are called 
implementation intentions. Prompting people to set their own, 
non-binding, ‘if-then’ commitments has proven to be effective 
in other domains and can be implemented in retirement saving 
as well. A possibility is to couple specific retirement saving actions 
or decisions to other recurring financial matters (e.g., “after I 
finish doing my taxes, I take 30 minutes to check my retirement 
savings”). 
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Restrict choice and set smart defaults. Our final recommendation 
accepts the fact that some people will refrain from action 
irrespective of any intervention; they will postpone or avoid 
retirement saving (Madrian & Shea, 2001). For such people, 
restricting their choices and using smart defaults can help, 
as inertia will have few negative consequences under those 
conditions.
 In this sense, the current Dutch retirement system is a perfect 
example. For many employees, inertia has little to no negative 
effect. They can expect a reasonable retirement income for 
which they have had to take little to no action. If retirement 
plans introduce more freedom of choice, especially in the 
accumulation phase, the consequences of inertia become greater. 
The possibility to adjust retirement savings to personal wants 
and needs may sound appealing, but in reality, people will only 
postpone or avoid. Between 60% and 80% of Dutch participants 
find it important that aspects of their retirement arrangement 
are automatically taken care of by the pension fund (Van Dalen 
& Henkens, 2015). Based on the current analysis, we therefore 
recommend leaving choice restricted in situations where people 
have or see little reason to take action and have or see ample 
reason for inertia. 
 If, however, freedom of choice is implemented or already 
present, it is valuable to set the appropriate defaults carefully, 
as many people will stick with them. This recommendation 
also applies to the introduction of second-pillar retirement 
arrangements for the self-employed, which may be seen as a 
promising first step. We expect that inertia will cause a relatively 
low rate of enrollment in these plans. This is not because the 
self-employed do not want to save for retirement, or because 
they do not care about retirement. Instead, we believe that 
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most reasons for inertia discussed in this paper are particularly 
relevant to this group. Therefore, we would recommend making 
saving the default for the self-employed, as is already the case for 
most other employees in the Netherlands. Under such a default, 
people would be automatically enrolled in a retirement saving 
arrangement, while retaining the freedom to switch plans or 
quit altogether. Other intermediate options, ranging from the 
current opt-in system for the self-employed to the paternalistic 
mandatory system for most other employees, are also possible. For 
instance, self-employed persons could be automatically enrolled 
in a retirement plan every year, with also every year the option to 
opt out. This kind of system would combine the idea of a smart 
default with repeated active choice framing. As with other opt-out 
systems, people would retain the complete freedom to opt out 
every year. However, because they would have to actively make 
this decision every year, they would deliberately choose when to 
save and when not.
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7. Conclusion
People find retirement saving important and valuable. None-
theless, many Dutch people remain passive when it comes to 
different stages of retirement saving. They take little action to 
improve their understanding of financial matters in general and 
of retirement saving specifically. They take little action to plan 
their financial future or to think about their expectations and 
their current situation. They take little action to adjust their saving 
strategy if necessary. How can we explain this inertia with regard 
to a subject as important as retirement saving?
 In this Netspar Survey Paper, we have provided an overview of 
explanations by analyzing the reasons for action and the reasons 
for inertia. The reasons for action are primarily financial. Saving 
requires an immediate financial investment, but inertia involves a 
cost in the long run. Because many people do not know, neglect, 
or underestimate these hidden, distant-future financial costs of 
waiting, they remain passive. Reasons for inertia are primarily 
psychological. Inertia can be explained by an increase in expected 
accuracy, avoidance of potential regret, increase in confidence, 
retention of flexibility, present-biased preferences, and undue 
optimism about the future.
 The analysis of these reasons leads to one crucial insight: 
whereas many people know why they should be saving for 
retirement, they do not know why now and how. In a final 
section, we therefore structured our recommendations for the 
Dutch retirement system around these two questions. In ‘Why 
Now?’, we recommended timely reminders, active choice framing, 
and deadlines. The goal of these recommendations is to make 
neglected or underestimated aspects of retirement saving more 
visible. In ‘How?’, we recommended simplification, commitment 
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options, and the restriction of choice and use of smart defaults. 
The goal of these recommendations is to make retirement saving 
easier. 
 We hope that this paper will help to better understand the 
dynamics of inertia. Such increased understanding may lead to 
promising ways for improving people’s retirement saving. Helping 
people to save for retirement is only possible if we understand 
their reasons for not doing anything. 
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Overcoming inertia in retirement saving
Saving for retirement is one of the most important financial matters 
people face during their lives. Whereas the Dutch, on average, 
accumulate sufficient retirement wealth, quite a few people will end up 
with lower savings than they expect or need. It is surprising that many 
people remain inactive even when action is needed. This paper by Job 
Krijnen, Marcel Zeelenberg and Seger Breugelmans (all TiU) addresses 
two questions about inertia. First, what reasons can explain people’s 
inertia in retirement saving? Second, how can our understanding of these 
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